

Sensing and Privacy

- The Yin-Yang of Ubiquitous Computing

Bio

Haojian Jin (<http://haojianj.in/>)


Asst. Prof @ UCSD-HDSI

HCI, Privacy, Mobile Computing

Ph.D. from CMU Human-Computer Interaction Institute

Before Ph.D.: worked at Yahoo Research, ran a startup

Looking for students and collaborators




What would our world be in 2035?

- Cheaper sensors
- More sensor deployments
- Better data mining algorithms
- Better and cheaper network/
storage/computing
-



Smart devices will know everything about us!



How can we protect users' privacy in a smart world?




Kiip:


Real-life rewards advertising

How can we protect users' privacy in a smart world?

Low battery



High surge price?



A ubiquitously connected world that ~~advertisers want~~

people want to live in

self-contradicting?

improves peoples' live

respect users' privacy

Data Smith Lab




Safe, fair, cheap, accessible data economy

This talk.



Software Defined Cooking

[MobiCom' 19, Featured in
Communications of the ACM]



Modular Privacy Flows


[Ph.D. dissertation]



Two important ingredients of a graduate student



Free pizza



Microwave oven

Today's Microwave: a **blunt heating** device



uneven & unpredictable heating

What is **software-defined cooking**?

Cooking is the **application of heat** to ingredients to transform them via chemical and physical reactions

Cooking is the **application of heat** to ingredients to transform them via chemical and physical reactions

programmable heating

heat the food in a software-defined thermal trajectory (recipe).


Perfectly-cooked bacon




overcooking fat,

without burning the meat.

SDC recipe is a progression of desired temperature vs. time per-pixel of food.





SDC (software-defined cooking): a novel low-cost **closed-loop** system that can **sense** and **control** heating at a **fine-grained** resolution.

Spoiler alert

No Turntable




Default Turntable



SDC Uniform Heating



SDC Arbitrary Heating



Spoiler alert

No Turntable



Default Turntable



SDC Uniform Heating



SDC Arbitrary Heating



Spoiler alert

No Turntable




Default Turntable



SDC Uniform Heating



SDC Arbitrary Heating



Today's Microwave: a **blunt heating** device


Sensing

Don't know how much heat
each food pixel has absorbed.


Actuation

Have no way to actuate heating
on a specific food pixel.

A closed-loop system to heat smartly



Sensing



Actuation

Heat Sensing

Microwave is **dangerous**



sharp-edged metals
(e.g., forks, most sensors,
motors)


Microwave-safe plastic

Eggs

battery

....


Neon lights



Glass

Electrodes

Low-pressure
Neon gas mixture





Placement of Neon Lights



64 T2 neon lights on the turntable & cover

3 cm spacing $<$ wavelength of 2.4 GHz (12.5 cm)

Optical fibers to conduct non-line-of-sight neon lights



Heat Actuation

Blind rotation



turn table




without turn table




with turn table


A closed-loop turntable



Microwave cannot heat individual pixels independently.



Knapsack problem



select a set of patterns whose union is
equivalent to the target heat pattern.

Spoiler alert

No Turntable



Default Turntable



SDC Uniform Heating



Spoiler alert

No Turntable



Default Turntable



SDC Uniform Heating



SDC Arbitrary Heating






MobiCom

patterned microwave susceptor
ensure coverage through SDC

Implementation & Evaluation

Prototype



**Sharp SM1441CW
(\$110 from Ebay)**


Neon lights

Camera x 2

Step motor

Arduino

Evaluation apparatus



thermal-chromatic
pigment + rice

reusable

turn pink if $p > 31^{\circ}\text{C}$

Evaluation

1

Uniform Heating:

heat the rice in a plate uniformly to 60°C over 2 minutes.

2

Arbitrary Heating:

heat parts of the rice to 500°C while the rest are at 50°C .

(stress test)

The room temperature is at 20°C .

30 sec

60 sec

90 sec

120 sec

no rotation




default rotation



SDC



Uniform Heating



30 sec

60 sec


90 sec

120 sec

no rotation



default rotation



cold spots

30 sec

60 sec

90 sec

120 sec

no rotation




default rotation




SDC







with a microwave susceptor ring




Maximum temperature delta: 183°C



App: Cooking bacon
More apps => Paper




App: Cooking bacon
More apps => Paper




App: Cooking bacon
More apps => Paper

Smart devices will know everything about us!




Sky is the limit.



When sounds hits an object, it causes that object to vibrate.

Users will lose control.





Foursquare



GirlsAroundMe

What's wrong? Or why is it wrong? How can we fix it?



Why is privacy hard?



GDPR



CCPA

Law



Users



Technology




Developers

This talk.



Software Defined Cooking


[MobiCom' 19, Featured in
Communications of the ACM]




Modular Privacy Flows

[Ph.D. dissertation]

Sousveillance (inverse surveillance) - **Transparency**



How can Nest prove that they only collect aggregated data?



Open source?

Your TV watch history contains too much insights



video #	duration	name	time	...
aaa	-	-	-	-
bbb	-	-	-	-
...




25 hours/week

How much time does the user spend on the TV?

- Is the user at home
- Activity routine
- User interests
-

Analyze data collection in 200+ smart home scenarios



Sensing research
(sensors)



Mobile privacy
(developers) [1]



Design fiction^[2]
interviews (users)

[1] MobiPurpose, H. Jin et al, IMWUT'18/UbiComp'19

[2] Privacy Speeddating, H. Jin et al., SIGCHI'22

77% Apps do not need raw data.

Sensor

Raw

Needed data

Hello visitor



Noise level



55 db

Principle of data minimization

*"Personal data shall be limited to **what is necessary** in relation to the **purposes** for which they are processed."*

- GDPR, Article 5 (1) (c)

Best practice

Only collect the necessary data for a specific purpose.



25 hours/week




Use weekly usage data to measure device engagement.

- ~~Is the user at home~~
- ~~Activity routine~~
- ~~User interests~~
-

How can developers prove themselves?

A strawman solution: **fine-grained** permission manifest



<manifest ...>

<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.
TV_AGGREGATED_DURATION_WEEKLEY" />

<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.
TV_AGGREGATED_DURATION_DAILY" />

.....

</manifest>


<https://www.android.com/tv/>

Fine-grained permission manifest

Peekaboo primitive (1)

Program pre-processing functions using chainable *operators*

A fixed set of operators



Edit aggregate node

Delete Cancel Done

Properties

Name aggregate [sum duration]

Data Type tabular

Target custom

Tabular field duration

Operation sum


Options (optional)

Group by

As ? new variable name

Peekaboo primitive (2)

A text-based whitelist *manifest* (i.e., program representation)



@purpose: *To measure device engagement.*

WeeklyUsageHours{

// operator [properties]

inject [weekly] ->

pull [smart TV driver] ->


aggregate [sum duration] ->

post [duration]


}

Peekaboo primitive (3)

A trusted **runtime** with pre-loaded implementations



Smart home app store



Programming environment
with operators




Runtime with preloaded
implementations

App developers

```
@purpose: To measure device engagement.
WeeklyUsageHours{
  // operator [properties]
  inject [weekly] ->
  pull [smart TV driver] ->
  aggregate [sum duration] ->
  post [duration]
}
```

Manifest



Peekaboo adoption

Smart home app store

Smart home app →


```
@purpose: To measure device engagement.  
WeeklyUsageHours{  
  // operator [properties]  
  inject [weekly] ->  
  pull [smart TV driver] ->  
  aggregate [sum duration] ->  
  post [duration]  
}
```




Edge devices



A local hub




Cloud



"Privacy firewall"


Peekaboo v.s. Firewall

Pre-process users' data to mitigate data overaccess.



How Peekaboo works

A fixed set of operators



Edge devices

video, image, audio, tabular, scalar



A **fixed** set of operators



How Peekaboo works

An operator = A verb keyword

select
[row]

	product_id	product_name	inventory_received	starting_inventory	inventory_on_hand	minimum_required
1	2	Booth	29pcs	27pcs	56pcs	20pcs
2	3	Maclean	23pkts	25pkts	48pkts	25pkts
3	4	Closeup	24pkts	25pkts	49pkts	25pkts



detect
[face]




select
[face]



How Peekaboo works


Operators are mapped to pre-loaded implementations



How Peekaboo works

A small set of pre-processing algorithms improve privacy

video #	duration	name	time	...
aaa	-	-	-	-
bbb	-	-	-	-
...



25 hours/week



Implementation (hardware)



Edge devices




Raspberry PI + TPU



Cloud


Implementation (software)

1. Operators: Node.JS package
2. Programming IDE: NodeRed
3. Drivers: 5 data types
4. 23 Preloaded implementations



Evaluation

Expressiveness (200+ smart home cases)



Evaluation

System performance



≈\$100

25 inference/s

100 filtering/s

1-80 ms per request

Utility privacy tradeoff example



incognito voice assistant

6 speakers
112 audio files [1]

noisify

<5% random pitch shift



Microsoft
Cognitive Services

Speech word error rate:


9.27% → 11.88%

Speaker recognition:

100% → 27.7%

Evaluation

Developer studies



Task descriptions

IDE & Unit tests


6 - 15 mins to
author a manifest

Advantages


Manifests enforce fine-grained data collection

```
@purpose: To measure device engagement.
WeeklyUsageHours{
  // operator [properties]
  inject [weekly] ->
  pull [smart TV driver] ->
  aggregate [sum duration] ->
  post [duration]
}
```

public, non-proprietary






User-developer privacy negotiation




- *Empower users (e.g., Ad-blocker)*
- *Empower good developers*
- *Empower trusted third-parties*

Repetitive implementation and *distributed* interfaces

Samsung



Nest



*Small
developers?*

Users?

Advantages

Manifests → *enforceable/dynamic* privacy nutrition labels

```
@purpose: To measure device engagement.
WeeklyUsageHours{
  // operator [properties]
  inject [weekly] ->
  pull [smart TV driver] ->
  aggregate [sum duration] ->
  post [duration]
}
```



Data Collection Disclosure	
TV Usage Summary App	
Running for	20 days
Total outgoing data packets	80
KBytes	
Sensor Type	Smart TV
Data type	TV Watch history
Granularity	Weekly aggregated durations by content category
Collection frequency	Every wednesday 1:00 AM
Destination	www.abc.com
Encryption	HTTPS
Customizations	
Rate limiting	N/A
More options


[1]

Advantages


Built-in fine-grained control through manifest rewriting

Data Collection Disclosure	
TV Usage Summary App	
Customizations	
Rate limiting	N/A
More options

Change the rate
to **monthly**




Let the good privacy drive out the bad privacy



Modular Privacy Flows (MPF) in a nutshell

Zoom accesses **all** your calendar events **continuously**!



Calendar events that contain
<https://zoom.us/xxxxxx>

Google APIs - All-or-nothing binary permissions


Scope	Meaning
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar</code>	read/write access to Calendars
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.readonly</code>	read-only access to Calendars
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events</code>	read/write access to Events
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events.readonly</code>	read-only access to Events
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.settings.readonly</code>	read-only access to Settings
<code>https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.addons.execute</code>	run as a Calendar add-on

“All-or-nothing binary permissions” is insufficient. (1)

Sender	Recipient	Attribute	Transmission Principle
a sleep monitor	the local police	{subject}'s location	if {subject} has given consent
a security camera	government intelligence agencies	{subject}'s eating habits	if {subject} is notified
a door lock	{subject}'s doctor	the times {subject} is home	if the information is kept confidential
a thermostat	an Internet service provider	{subject}'s exercise routine	if the information is anonymous
a fitness tracker	its manufacturer	{subject}'s sleeping habits	if the information is used to perform
a refrigerator	other devices in the home	audio of {subject}	maintenance on the device
a power meter	{subject}'s immediate family	video of {subject}	if the information is used to provide
a personal assistant	{subject}'s social media accounts	{subject}'s heart rate	a price discount
(e.g. Amazon Echo)		the times it is used	if the information is used for advertising
			if the information is used to develop
			new features for the device
			if the information is not stored
			if the information is stored indefinitely
			if its privacy policy permits it
			in an emergency situation
			<i>null (no transmission principle)</i>

MPF in a nutshell


“All-or-nothing binary permissions” is insufficient. (2)




MPF in a nutshell

Program data transformation functions using chainable *operators*

URL-based APIs





Operator-based APIs



MPF in a nutshell

A text-based whitelist *manifest* (i.e., program representation)



```
@purpose: The app can access calendar events
which contains a zoom link.
ZoomCalendarIntegration{
  // operator [properties]
  inject[...] -> pull Calendar[...] ->
  filter [Zoom join link pattern] ->
  post [Zoom events]
}
```


Broader application domains



Smart Home




Smart City




Mobile apps



Social network



Personal data API




Browser extensions

The future is private.





Sousveillance (inverse surveillance) - **Transparency**




- Auditable software/hardware

Purpose-based data economy



- New infrastructure to address data ownership/pricing

User-developer privacy negotiation



- *Empower users (e.g., Ad-blocker)*
- *Empower good developers*
- *Empower trusted third-parties*

Data Smith Lab



Safe, fair, cheap, accessible data economy

A close-up portrait of Uncle Ben, an elderly man with white hair and a serious expression, wearing a brown jacket over a red and white plaid shirt. The background is slightly blurred, showing a window and some indoor plants.

**Remember,
with great power
comes great
responsibility.**

- Uncle Ben

Haojian Jin
haojian@ucsd.edu

Developers do not want to minimize data collection.


COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT



A 14.5 Million Euro Fine for Failing to Get Rid of Old Files – Data Minimization Is Becoming a Stand-Alone Cybersecurity Obligation

by [Avi Gesser](#), [Matthew Kelly](#), [Will Schildknecht](#), [Dr. Vera Jungkind \(Hengeler Mueller\)](#), and [Dr. Carolin Raspé \(Hengeler Mueller\)](#)

[We have written several times here](#) over the last few years about data minimization being an important part of an effective cybersecurity program. For most companies, the total amount of data that they control grows substantially each year, and more data




Strong policies on data minimization

New interaction paradigms and development supports


Adoption (2)

MPF is not the only way to implement data minimization.


```
<manifest ...>  
  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.  
    ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" />  
</manifest>
```



Binary permissions



Database approach



Remote code execution